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Northern Ireland Representation at Westminster: Constitutional Conundrums 
and Political Manœuvres 
 
                        GRAHAM WALKER and GARETH MULVENNA 
Queen’s University Belfast 
 
This article focuses on the issue of Northern Ireland’s representation at Westminster. 
It investigates the political context of the decision to increase Northern Ireland’s 
representation in the house of commons at Westminster from 12 members to 17 in 
1978–9. Exploring this episode in more detail, it is argued, provides a more 
informed overall understanding of the history of devolution in the UK and of the 
way issues concerning Northern Ireland often overlapped with questions of 
constitutional change in Scotland and Wales. The article also throws light on the 
matter of Northern Ireland MPs and their voting rights at Westminster during 
Northern Ireland’s experience of devolution prior to 1972. 
 
Keywords: Northern Ireland; representation; Westminster parliament; devolution; 
Labour government; Ulster Unionism; integration; Kilbrandon Commission; 
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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this article is to investigate the political context of the decision to 
increase Northern Ireland’s representation in the house of commons at Westminster from 12 
members to 17 in 1978–9. It will shed light on the way that issues concerning Northern 
Ireland following the suspension of the Stormont parliament in 1972 (and its dissolution in 
1973), in particular efforts to bring peace, could coincide and overlap significantly with 
questions of constitutional change (devolution) for Scotland and Wales, and suggest that the 
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UK’s constitutional debates of this decade cannot be properly understood without the 
Northern Ireland dimension. In addition, the article will examine the political manœuvring 
around the issue of the increase in Northern Ireland MPs and its centrality to the working 
arrangement reached between the Callaghan Labour government and the Ulster Unionists 
from the spring of 1977 to the end of the government in 1979. 
The article will first provide some background to the controversy of the Northern 
Ireland increase by discussing briefly the history of relations between the Stormont 
parliament and Westminster, and the way that the issue of representation – later to become 
known as the ‘West Lothian Question’ during the debates on devolution for Scotland and 
Wales – manifested itself when Northern Ireland, in the period between 1921 and 1972, was 
the sole part of the UK to experience devolution. 
2. An Uneasy Relationship: Interactions between Stormont and Westminster, 1921–72 
 
Between the birth in 1921 of Northern Ireland as a devolved unit of government and the  
turbulence of the 1960s, relations between Belfast and London were, for the most part,  
quietly harmonious. Between 1921 and 1940, when Prime Minister Lord Craigavon’s  
Unionist regime held power in Stormont, devolution was not used in order to diverge 
significantly from Britain – indeed Craigavon’s governments attempted as much as possible 
to affirm the province’s British identity through the constitutional arrangements that 
Unionists had been given. For example, a ‘step-by-step’ process was implemented in relation 
to social services as a means of minimising the disjunctive effects of devolution, namely the 
detachment of Northern Ireland politically from Westminster and the British party system.1  
While those in power in Northern Ireland balanced the promotion of a unique Ulster identity 
with an obligation to ensure that their constituents were socially on a par with those on the 
mainland, members of parliament from Northern Ireland holding seats in the Westminster 
house of commons were able to vote on social and political matters which affected only those 
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living in England, Scotland and Wales. For the 50-year period when Northern Ireland 
possessed devolution, the MPs returned to Westminster were overwhelmingly Unionists, and, 
except on rare occasions, chose to take the Conservative whip. These MPs, as Jackson points 
out, were not delegates of the Unionist government in Belfast, and relations between the two 
were often tense and problematic, especially following the Second World War.2  
      The anomaly of the Ulster MPs voting at Westminster on non-Ulster matters, re-
christened ‘The West Lothian Question’ during debates on Scottish and Welsh devolution in 
the 1970s and the subject of the recent McKay Commission enquiry,3 generally went 
unchallenged until notable questions were raised over the manner in which this voting 
privilege was exercised during an episode that occurred during Harold Wilson’s initial term 
as prime minister from 1964 to 1966.  
     Wilson possessed a visionary strategy for the modernisation of industry and technological 
advancement, and he was eager to lay down an early marker with the proposed 
nationalisation of the steel industry. This would not prove to be straightforward and the 
measure was predictably opposed by the Conservatives who drew on the support of Ulster 
Unionist MPs at Westminster in attempting to block Wilson’s ambitions, despite the fact that 
the issue would not impact on Northern Ireland. Wilson was understandably vexed at this 
apparent anomaly. He had already witnessed two of his more right-wing back benchers, 
Woodrow Wyatt and Desmond Donnelly, oppose his steel plans, leading him initially to back 
down rather than jeopardise his thin majority.4 Frustrated by Unionists potentially setting up 
another obstacle to his ambitions, Wilson asked his attorney general, Elwyn Jones, to devise 
an ‘in and out’ solution to the seeming incongruity of Northern Irish MPs at Westminster 
assisting in the buffering of a proposed legislative process which was outside their 
constitutional area of concern. A similar ‘in and out’ solution had been proposed during the 
time of Gladstone’s first Home Rule Bill of the late 19th century. The proposal then, which 
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was eventually thought to be unworkable and dropped, would have allowed Irish MPs to vote 
on ‘imperial’ issues but not on those of domestic concern to Great Britain.5 Wilson perhaps 
anticipated – or more to the point, hoped – that Elwyn Jones would be able to design a 
modern version of this and thus prevent the Conservatives utilising the support of Ulster 
Unionist MPs at Westminster. Wilson, moreover, made direct contact on the matter with 
Northern Ireland’s prime minster and Unionist Party leader, Terence O’Neill. O’Neill 
explained that there were far fewer MPs from Northern Ireland than population numbers 
warranted, and that this was the ‘trade-off’ that had hardened into a convention, or 
‘gentleman’s agreement’, best left undisturbed.6 This was a point that would be made 
regularly when the debate was joined in the 1970s over the question of revising the number of 
Northern Ireland representatives. Wilson, however, was undeterred and went so far as to 
suggest that O’Neill might advise the Unionist members in the house of commons not to vote 
on certain controversial subjects such as race relations.7 Away from these prickly exchanges 
between Wilson and O’Neill, Elwyn Jones duly investigated the possibility of implementing 
an ‘in and out’ solution but concluded that it was too complex an issue to resolve. Jones’s 
difficulty foreshadowed what lay in store for those who later tried to formulate an answer to 
the conundrum.   
The shadow attorney general, Peter Thorneycroft, rebuked Wilson’s attempts to 
tamper with MPs’ voting rights and protested on behalf of the Conservatives (and ultimately 
the Unionists), declaring in the house of commons in October 1965, that: ‘every Member of 
the House of Commons is equal with every other Member of the House of Commons, and 
that all of us will speak on all subjects’.8 Notwithstanding Wilson’s antipathy towards the 
Unionist MPs who sat in the house of commons from 1964 to 1966 and the complications 
they caused, British Steel was set up in July 1967 following Labour’s more emphatic election 
victory of 1966. However, this episode and Wilson’s unsuccessful attempts to change 
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parliamentary convention brought to bear the complexities of Northern Ireland’s influence as 
a devolved part of the UK on matters at Westminster. During this period, the Northern 
Ireland prime minister, Terence O’Neill, was attempting to lower sectarian passions through 
the promotion of the benefits of regional planning,9 and although O’Neill’s vision for growth 
was often somewhat cosmetic, he was an evangelist for the potential that devolution offered; 
indeed, he supported its extension to other parts of the UK.10  It would be during the late 
1960s and 1970s when Northern Irish society was in a state of flux due to civil disorder and 
paramilitary violence, that more notice would be taken of Northern Ireland’s system of 
government, its relationship with Westminster, and the possibilities of the province as a 
devolutionary model. In written evidence for the royal (Kilbrandon) commission on the 
constitution in 1972, G.B. Adams, a self-proclaimed ‘Ulster Protestant of the Liberal Home 
Rule tradition’,11 bemoaned the fact that the violence on the streets had undermined the 
system of government in Northern Ireland such as to suggest its abolition ‘at a time when 
general trends of thought, which have called the Commission into being, would otherwise 
point not merely to its preservation but to an extension of its powers and functions’.12 The 
Northern Ireland parliament was, in fact, prorogued by the Conservative government in 
March 1972 in light of the deleterious security situation and worsening community relations.   
Concurrent with Wilson’s difficulties over the steel issue, a house of commons 
exchange on the subject of Northern Ireland in October 1965 highlighted the constitutional 
anomaly of the MPs’ voting rights in some detail. Paul Rose, MP for Manchester Blackley 
and later to be chairman of the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster, took the opportunity of 
the constituency boundaries question in Northern Ireland being raised to challenge the 
Unionist MPs in the House, and Sir Knox Cunningham in particular, for the perceived ills 
wrought by Unionist hegemony and gerrymandering.13 As Rose’s attack on Unionist rule in 
Northern Ireland intensified, the formalities and etiquette of the House were called into 
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question, with the issue of MPs interfering in matters of other constituencies being 
highlighted. Addressing this point, Captain Lawrence (Willy) Orr, Unionist MP for Down 
South, stated: 
There is one other matter in the hon. Member's speech to which I shall refer which is in a way 
extraneous to the debate but is not out of order. He queried whether it was right for Members of 
this House who come from Northern Ireland to take part in debating everything which comes 
before this House. In other words, he seemed to be suggesting that perhaps it was wrong for 
hon. Members from Northern Ireland to interfere in matters which were, let us say, purely 
English matters. But exactly the same argument would apply to hon. Members from Scotland or 
from Wales.14 
Responding, Rose contrasted his ability to comment on any Scottish issue with the  
lack of such a privilege in respect of Northern Ireland, whereas Orr was free to  
comment on anything before the House,15 prompting Orr to stress the same point  
made by O’Neill to Wilson: 
I accept that argument up to a point. It was clearly understood in the debates on the 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920. This is the reason why the constituency of my hon. and 
learned Friend the Member for Antrim, South (Sir Knox Cunningham) is twice the size of the 
hon. Member's constituency at Blackley. This is why the Act of 1920 limited the number of 
Members from Northern Ireland, because they could not start limiting their powers and 
functions. 
The people of Northern Ireland are taxpayers. The Budget produced at the Dispatch Box in this 
House applies to all my constituents. Until recently, for example, it might have been thought 
wrong for a Member from Northern Ireland to express any view about, let us say, the affairs of 
London Transport. But London Transport is now to be subsidised in order to keep down the 
fares of London commuters. My constituents in County Down will have to pay a portion, it may 
be only a small portion, of that subsidy. Why on earth should they have no say in it? The hon. 
Member is on a bad constitutional argument and I do not think that it is worth spending too 
much time on it.16 
Later, in a speech to fellow Ulster Unionists, Orr accused Labour left-wingers of attempting 
to upset the convention by which Northern Ireland matters were not discussed at 
Westminster. For Orr, this convention was ‘fundamental’ to Northern Ireland’s constitution, 
and his remarks have interest in relation to UK devolution since 1999.  He argued as follows:  
If Stormont matters are permitted to be discussed at Westminster, a Minister or Ministers at 
Westminster will have to assume the responsibility for Northern Ireland affairs. No minister 
will assume such responsibility without the power to go with it. This ultimately means the end 
of the freedom of action of Stormont which would be reduced to a mere agency of the United 
Kingdom Government.17 
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     The rights of Scottish MPs at Westminster also became a matter of debate around the 
same time as the Wilson Labour government contemplated the Northern Ireland case. In 
1967, a row broke out over the attempted exclusion of a Scottish MP, John Mackintosh, from 
a specialist committee on agriculture, the remit of which did not extend to Scotland, set up by 
the leader of the House, Richard Crossman.18 Mackintosh, a constitutional affairs scholar, 
was not likely to take this lying down and he responded combatively, citing the Northern 
Ireland precedent and the related significance of Scotland’s ‘administrative devolution’ 
arrangements of the time. Mackintosh argued:  
It has always been accepted that members are elected to a UK Parliament and that there are no 
grounds for excluding them from discussions because they represent one constituency or 
another. This has been stated authoritatively over Northern Irish members when they have 
taken part on the floor of the House and in Committee not merely on matters solely affecting 
England but on matters which Parliament cannot discuss in relation to Northern Ireland. 
 
Mackintosh, addressing Crossman, went on:  
You cannot suggest a different and harsher rule should apply to Scottish members. It is on this 
ground among others that English members serve on the Scottish Grand Committee. If there 
was ever a specialist committee on the Scottish Office, I would oppose it being confined solely 
to Scots MPs. If this rule was established, it would exclude Scottish members from serving on 
specialist committees on health, housing and local government, home office affairs, and 
education as all these have a sub-section in the Scottish Office. Also some of the most useful 
work comes from comparisons of the experience of very similar problems handled in slightly 
different ways by the Scottish and the relevant English Department.19 
For Harold Wilson, the Ulster Unionist MPs’ behaviour remained a sore point, and he 
was to return to the theme when the civil rights agitation convulsed Northern Ireland in late 
1968. Jackson has even speculated that he may have been hinting at a deal over the issue in 
the context of supporting the O’Neill government through its difficulties.20 By this time, 
Wilson was also facing a Nationalist challenge in Scotland and Wales, to which he responded 
by setting up a royal commission on the constitution.21 Significantly, Northern Ireland was 
included within the remit of the enquiry, and O’Neill even influenced decisions on the 
commission’s terms of reference.22 The commission’s deliberations were to have far-reaching 
consequences as constitutional matters shaped the political and parliamentary agenda of the 
following decade. 
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3. The Political Significance of Northern Ireland Representation at Westminster, 
1972–9 
The prorogation of the Stormont parliament by the Conservative government in March 1972 
resulted in the political framework of the Northern Ireland question being significantly 
redrawn. The subsequent search for a solution focused on the restoration of a form of 
devolved government for the province that would command sufficient cross-community 
support. However, in the absence of such a solution being arrived at – the power-sharing 
executive produced by the Sunningdale agreement of December 1973 was only able to 
survive five months – the Westminster parliament was the only body in which Northern 
Ireland’s elected representatives could be heard.23 
For some 50 years, the people of Northern Ireland had become accustomed to paying 
scant attention to the performance of its small band of MPs at Westminster; indeed, there was 
a substantial degree of public cynicism about them ‘hiding’ in London and being out of 
touch.24 Scholarly appraisals of the ‘Ulster Party’ at Westminster have highlighted the 
uneasy, and often fractious, relationships between the Westminster Unionist MPs and the 
governing Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) in Belfast, and the unwillingness of the constituency 
parties to invest in representatives of a higher calibre.25 In the 1960s, when Northern Ireland’s 
government came under pressure over civil rights issues and allegations of discrimination, the 
Unionists paid the price for the long years of neglect concerning the quality of their 
representation in London, and the festering of personal jealousies and tensions over influence 
and position. Notwithstanding some anxieties on the part of the Heath government, the Ulster 
Unionist MPs mobilised little effective opposition to the imposition of direct rule.26 
From the time of the suspension of Stormont, it became essential for Unionists to 
professionalise the Westminster dimension of their operation, and Jackson has observed that 
the Ulster MPs certainly worked notably harder after 1972.27 Back in Ulster, constituency 
associations paid much more attention to the choice of candidates for Westminster seats.28 
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If the removal of Stormont caused consternation among Ulster Unionists in general, 
there was, nevertheless, a perception on the part of particular Westminster Unionist MPs of 
an opportunity to enhance their standing. Direct rule, after all, could plausibly be regarded as 
compatible with unionism’s core principles, however much the party’s pride in Northern 
Ireland had been damaged. For those Unionist political voices outside of the old governing 
party, particularly the Reverend Ian Paisley, the doing-away with the UUP power base was 
not a matter for despondency; indeed, Paisley was publicly to push the line of integration 
with the rest of the UK as his preferred political option in 1972–3. At this crucial juncture, 
unionism and loyalism in fact spoke with a variety of voices and spanned a lengthy spectrum 
of views on the constitutional question.29 
For those who were happy to take up the challenge – and the opportunity – of a new 
role and greater influence at Westminster, there was a clear and urgent objective: Northern 
Ireland’s representation in the house of commons should be increased. Soon the matter of 
representation occasioned deliberation in Whitehall. In January 1973, as the royal 
commission on the constitution, chaired by Lord Kilbrandon following the death of Crowther, 
was bringing its work to a close, a memorandum by Ian Burns of the Northern Ireland Office 
(NIO) on ‘NI Representation at Westminster’ referred to the ‘strong pressure’ for an increase 
in MPs, and provided comparable figures for the other parts of the UK. Burns noted that 
Northern Ireland was then represented by 12 MPs;30 the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, 
which provided for the devolved structures for the six-county unit also reduced Westminster 
representation, so that in Northern Ireland, a constituency would have an average of 50,738 
electors in comparison with an average in Great Britain of 34,158. Burns observed that there 
was clear logic to the argument that Northern Ireland, on account of the loss of its devolved 
parliament, should have the same degree of representation at Westminster as other areas of 
the UK. Even if devolution was restored, Westminster’s role in the affairs of the province 
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would be likely to remain so crucial as to justify the case for an increase. Burns also noted 
that, depending on the basis of comparison, Northern Ireland could be said to be entitled to as 
many seats as 20, if Scotland was taken as the reference point, or 19, if the comparison was 
with Wales, or 16, if it was England. For Great Britain as a whole the entitlement would be 
17, while if there was an equal share-out of all 635 seats, then Northern Ireland would have 
16 members.31 
The Conservative government’s white paper on ‘Northern Ireland Constitutional 
Proposals’ of March 197332 outlined the power-sharing and ‘Irish Dimension’ model that was 
agreed at the end of the year at Sunningdale, although a majority of the various Unionists 
returned in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections in June were opposed. In his diary for 23 
March, the newspaper baron, Cecil King, records a conversation with Labour MP, Brian 
Walden, who told him that the proposal in the white paper that the Northern Ireland 
representation at Westminster should remain at 12 MPs was the condition laid down by the 
Labour Party for a bipartisan policy on Ireland. King notes that Heath would, nevertheless, 
face great pressure from his own party and from Northern Ireland to raise the number to 20.33 
Certainly it seems that the issue assumed great significance for the Labour Party, a reflection 
probably of the way the voting behaviour of the Ulster MPs had incensed the party hierarchy 
during the Wilson years in government; the Ulster Unionist refusal to compromise had left a 
bitter aftertaste. Essentially, the Labour Party had no wish to see Northern Ireland 
representation strengthened since this would only, in all likelihood, mean more political 
opponents. 
Ulster Unionist MPs at Westminster, such as future UUP leader, James Molyneaux, 
highlighted the issue of representation around claims of a substantially-increased workload 
for Ulster MPs since the abolition of Stormont,34 and the case for change received a signal 
boost with the publication of the (Kilbrandon) royal commission report at the end of October. 
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This report was primarily notable for its recommendation that elected devolved assemblies 
should be established for Scotland and Wales, but the report also drew on the Northern 
Ireland experience of devolution between 1921 and 1972, took evidence from Northern 
Ireland, and recommended that the province’s representation at Westminster now be 
increased to 17 MPs.35 The commission’s deliberations had, in fact, caused the government 
some anxiety when it appeared that interim conclusions reached in 1971 suggested Stormont 
had actually worked well and that the real difficulties and legitimate criticisms about 
gerrymandering and discrimination related to local government. The Heath government 
feared that any ‘clean bill of health’ for Stormont would only strengthen opposition to the 
new broader-based devolutionary path he and his secretary of state, Willie Whitelaw, were 
pursuing; nor did the government wish its policy initiative for Northern Ireland to be 
complicated by demands for ‘old Stormont’-style devolution for Scotland and Wales.36 In the 
event, the final report spared the government from any inconvenient recommendations about 
the political future of Northern Ireland, and, indeed, included a criticism of Stormont’s past 
failure to protect the interests of the minority that chimed with the thrust of the government’s 
white paper.37 None the less, it may have been felt that such reticence to create difficulties for 
the government should be balanced with the firm recommendation that Northern Ireland’s 
representation at Westminster should be determined by the rules applied to other parts of the 
UK, given the removal of Stormont. Moreover, the representation issue exercised the 
fastidious minds of Whitehall and the NIO. On being shown a summary of Kilbrandon’s 
conclusions ahead of publication, D.J. Trevelyan of the NIO forecast ‘problems’ surrounding 
the MPs’ question: ‘We are going to hear a lot more of this from the Unionists, among 
others.’38 
Indeed, Ulster Unionists applied parliamentary pressure on the issue, citing the 
Kilbrandon report,39 while the Ulster MPs were joined in their demands by some 
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Conservatives. In a letter to the press Molyneaux, along with John Biggs-Davison and other 
tory MPs, welcomed the Kilbrandon recommendations but made the claim that Northern 
Ireland was entitled to at least 20 seats, and not just the suggested figure of 17.40 This was an 
early indication of ‘dissident’ Conservative back-bench opinion over Northern Ireland that 
focused on the anomalies of the ‘direct rule’ system of government.41 
The inconclusive general election of February 1974 resulted in the fall of the 
Conservatives and the return of Labour as a minority government, and, furthermore, dealt a 
huge blow to the prospects of the fledgling power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland that 
had sat since January. At this election, 11 out of the 12 Northern Ireland seats returned 
opponents of the experiment under the banner of the United Ulster Unionist Council 
(UUUC), a body comprising Unionists from different parties all united in opposition to the 
concept of power-sharing as of right, and to the ‘Irish Dimension’ involving the government 
of the Republic of Ireland. The executive later fell in May 1974 amidst the chaos produced by 
the Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) strike. In the general election of October 1974, Labour 
emerged with an overall majority of three seats while Northern Ireland, again, gave a strong 
endorsement to the hard-line Unionists. In July 1974, during a debate on Kilbrandon, 
Unionist MP, Robert Bradford, had called for the increase in the province’s representation to 
be taken forward so that the house of commons would ‘reflect the will of the majority in 
Northern Ireland’ when sovereignty was claimed by a ‘foreign state’. In the same debate, 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) MP and leader, Gerry Fitt, put the Nationalist 
objection to any increase on the grounds that it would be likely merely to entrench 
intransigent Unionist views over political change.42 
On assuming office after the first 1974 election, Labour, again led by Wilson, felt 
constrained to head off the growing Scottish National Party (SNP) threat – they won seven 
seats in the February poll and would go on to add four more in October – by pursuing plans 
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for devolution. In the white paper ‘Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and 
Wales’ of September 1974 it was laid down, contrary to Kilbrandon, that Scotland and Wales 
should retain their existing number of members in the house of commons,43 an exercise in 
political self-protection given the Labour strength in Scotland and Wales, and reassurance to 
those in the Scottish Labour ranks who had feared devolution for the possible repercussions 
on Scottish representation and influence at Westminster.44 
However, in proceeding this way, the government clearly also exposed itself to the 
contention that there was a glaring anomaly in relation to Northern Ireland that required to be 
remedied. The new Northern Ireland secretary of state, Merlyn Rees, in the wake of the 
failure of the Sunningdale project, opted to set up an elected constitutional convention to 
consider what form of government might have the greatest support across the community, 
and he hoped to distance the Northern Ireland problem from other UK matters such as 
devolution for Scotland and Wales.45 However, this proved difficult in practice. 
For the constitutional convention elections of May 1975, the UUUC produced a 
manifesto, the first demand of which was ‘Full representation in the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom’ which was defined as 21 seats, the same in proportion to population as Scotland. 
Second, the UUUC demanded a ‘democratically elected Parliament with a system of 
government broadly in line with the provisions to be made for constitutional devolution in the 
United Kingdom as a whole’. The manifesto went on to reject any ‘artificial device’ for 
giving any political party or interest a larger share of representation, influence or power than 
it was entitled to by virtue of electoral support, and any imposed ‘Irish Dimension’.46 
By the time of the government’s white paper on devolution in late 1975,47 much 
political and civil service ingenuity had been spent ensuring that Northern Ireland would be 
regarded as a separate case from Scotland and Wales, yet it is plausible to argue that the 
prospect of arrangements resembling the ‘old Stormont’ for Scotland and Wales only served 
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to reinforce Unionist demands for equal treatment, and thus not to be pushed into accepting 
singular features such as built-in power-sharing. Moreover, it appears from the intervention 
of the NIO officials in the devolution working groups that the government was encouraged to 
be extra cautious in what it proposed for Scotland and Wales for fear of exacerbating the 
Northern Ireland situation.48 In the event the white paper led to the defection of two Scottish 
Labour MPs, and was to prove the basis for the ill-fated and badly-drafted Scotland and 
Wales Bill which was terminated by the government’s defeat on a guillotine motion in 
February 1977. Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland, the constitutional convention’s majority 
report, issued in late 1975, simply reflected the UUUC position and gave Rees nothing to 
work with regarding the prospect of a truly consensus-based government.49 The convention 
was finally wound up in March 1976. 
At one point in the summer of 1975, the convention appeared to witness growing 
agreement across traditional and political divides with much good humour and a genuine 
desire to prove that politics could trump violence. The common points were resentment over 
the role of ill-informed English politicians and government officials, and of inadequate 
arrangements for Northern Ireland business at Westminster, and the belief that ‘Ulstermen’ 
knew best how to deal with their problems.50 The convention, indeed, did appear to supply 
evidence of the ‘Ulster Nationalism’ detected by Merlyn Rees,51 and this dismayed the 
emerging integrationist tendency in Ulster Unionism, now best articulated at Westminster by 
Enoch Powell. Powell had joined the UUP in 1974 and such was this regarded a major ‘coup’ 
for the party that he was effectively parachuted into the seat of South Down for the October 
election of that year and duly elected. Before he left the Conservatives for the UUP, Powell 
had identified the cause of Ulster as ‘the test of Britain’s national will to live’.52 Where others 
saw a multinational UK state, Powell imagined an organic and unitary British nation, and he 
possessed a reverence for the Westminster parliament and for the doctrine of the sovereignty 
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of parliament that echoed A.V. Dicey, the legal thinker who had done much to supply the 
constitutional arguments against Irish home rule back in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.53 Powell made it his goal to earn his UUP spurs at Westminster with special 
reference to the demand for an increase in representation in order to substantiate the 
integrationist line as the defining one for Unionism. In this he was ably supported by James 
Molyneaux, whose integrationist instincts and wish to play a ‘long political game’ had 
already reoriented the UUP at Westminster around the representation issue, and other 
objectives such as the restoration of meaningful local government and an end to the ‘Orders 
in Council’ system by which Northern Ireland legislation was dealt with at Westminster. The 
scene was set for a campaign to achieve what both men regarded as the invaluable symbolic 
goal for Unionism of equal treatment in the ‘Mother of Parliaments’.  In April 1976, 
Molyneaux made the ‘modest claim’ that the party’s MPs were ‘the most effective force that 
Ulster has yet fielded’.54 
Yet it would not prove to be a straightforward political manœuvre to reorient Ulster 
Unionism as a broad movement that encompassed several political tendencies, 
preoccupations, and aspirations. Indeed, Powell and Molyneaux’s prioritising of integrationist 
goals at Westminster created tensions with many in the UUP itself back in Northern Ireland, 
particularly the strong pro-devolutionist leader, Harry West, as well as the main political 
figures outside it, such as Paisley and William Craig.55 Even in Powell’s own South Down 
constituency party there was opposition: Colonel E.H. Brush, an elected member of the 
constitutional convention, declared in April 1976: ‘There is something which MPs must 
remember, the restoration of devolved government is of infinitely greater importance to us at 
the grassroots than the increase of Ulster members to 18, that aim is part of our manifesto but 
it is secondary.’56 
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Powell and Molyneaux, it might be said, paid lip service to the UUUC demand that 
devolution be restored to Northern Ireland on the same terms as those proposed for Scotland 
and Wales. In a conversation with the prime minister in October 1975, Powell was frank 
about his wish to use the complex devolution controversies over Scotland and Wales as a way 
of ‘playing the Northern Ireland question long’. He referred to the ‘leverage of devolution’ 
for his own political purposes provided Northern Ireland should not ‘move ahead of 
devolution in Scotland’.57 Powell was clearly gratified by the convention’s failure, and urged 
Ulster Unionists to rejoice in the way their representatives were now ‘an integral part’ of the 
house of commons in contrast to the past: ‘They are no longer a contingent of half-strangers, 
who appear from outside to complain, to demonstrate, to protest – or to acquiesce. They are 
part and parcel of the place, working from within.’ He added that the MPs had become ‘the 
living evidence of the reality and permanence of the Union’.58 
The UUP leader, Harry West, was angered by the apparent indifference shown to the 
convention by the integrationists, and many of his public interventions in its aftermath were 
clearly aimed at trying to restore the political credibility he felt he had lost. This could mean 
flatly contradicting Powell: ‘The position of the tiny Ulster group of members at Westminster 
is not and cannot be an influential one. If they did become really influential, the 
establishment would act quickly in some way to take their influence from them.’59 West’s 
view, much ventilated in the proceedings of the constitutional convention, was that the 
question was not so much raising the number of MPs, although that would be welcome; 
rather, it was the reality of the Northern Ireland voice never being adequately heard or 
listened to at Westminster. Nevertheless, future developments were to throw up 
circumstances West could not then have envisaged for the Ulster MPs to exercise influence in 
the way craved by Powell. 
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As the debate ensued over the Devolution Bill for Scotland and Wales, brought 
forward by the government now led by James Callaghan, following Wilson’s resignation in 
March 1976, the question of representation loomed larger. As has been well observed by 
scholars and commentators, then and since, the dogged determination of the anti-devolution 
Scottish Labour MP, Tam Dalyell, to keep asking what came to be called, after his 
constituency, ‘The West Lothian Question’, caused awkward problems for the government.60 
The question of whether devolution for one part of the UK ought to prevent the 
representatives of that region from voting on issues pertaining to other parts recalled the 
situation that existed for over 50 years when Northern Ireland had its own parliament. 
Speculation about changes to either the number of representatives from the different parts of 
the UK – it was suggested that English representation be increased to compensate – or to their 
voting rights, once again highlighted the anomaly of the Northern Ireland case as it then 
stood, and the compelling arguments for an increase in the number of MPs to which the 
province was entitled on the basis of direct comparison with the other parts of the UK.61 
An NIO memo of October 1976 noted the Northern Ireland aspect to the 
representation question around devolution, and flagged up the opposition of the SDLP. It also 
drew attention to a vital consideration of the government in its conduct of policy towards 
Northern Ireland, namely the use of the issue of the increase as bait to entice Unionists to 
compromise: ‘the possibility of increased representation at Westminster is one of the 
incentives to the Unionists to agree on a form of devolved government: the government have 
said repeatedly that the time to look at the question of representation at Westminster is when 
agreement has been reached on devolved government, and not before’.62 A follow-up 
memorandum referred to the new Northern Ireland secretary of state, Roy Mason, desiring 
‘magnets’ such as the promise of an increase in MPs, to lure the local Ulster politicians into 
dialogue.63 
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The matter also landed at the door of the lord president, Michael Foot, responsible for 
managing the government’s legislative programme.64 In a memorandum, Foot acknowledged 
that the Northern Ireland case had to be considered in the context of any change brought 
about by the devolution legislation, but stressed that Labour’s own party interest would be 
best served by ‘the minimum change from the current relativities between the four countries’. 
Foot’s preferred option was a Speaker’s conference to consider the representation issue in the 
round if devolution came into effect for Scotland and/or Wales.65 
This stance was soon thrown into disarray as back-bench Labour opposition to change 
in the level of representation erupted, and Callaghan quickly vetoed the Speaker’s conference 
idea. A significant number of back benchers signalled that they would not support the 
government’s ‘guillotine’ motion on the Scotland and Wales Bill if a Speaker’s conference 
was conceded, and the government, indeed, mobilised on 1 February 1977 against an 
amendment by Conservative shadow home secretary, Francis Pym, calling for a Speaker’s 
conference, and fell back on the old line that Northern Ireland representation would be 
reviewed if there was political agreement there.66 Foot, in the house of commons, was forced 
into defending the government’s insistence on maintaining the existing levels of Scottish and 
Welsh representation while ‘stone-walling’ on Northern Ireland.67 A further confidential 
memorandum on ‘Westminster Representation’ noted the support Unionists had from the 
Conservative front bench and some Labour back benchers, while weighing the problem of 
SDLP and Dublin opposition and a possible violent response from the Provisional IRA: ‘It 
[the increase] might be construed as a shift in the direction of HMG’s policy, and a 
weakening in the resolve to restore devolved government; in particular it might be portrayed 
as a move towards integration.’ The writer of the memorandum reflected the extent to which 
the matter had proved politically vexatious at a sensitive juncture regarding the government’s 
programme and devolution in particular: ‘The sooner we are off this hook the better.’68 
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As it turned out, the government lost the guillotine measure on 22 February 1977 with 
22 Labour MPs voting against, and it was left to accept that it would have to think again on 
the way forward for devolution.69 First, it would have to face a no-confidence vote in the 
House and in this context it needed to ensure support from whatever quarter it could find it. 
This led Callaghan to sweeten the Unionists with a promise of a Speaker’s conference over 
the Northern Ireland representation issue, a climbdown from his position prior to the 
guillotine vote. No formal agreement was reached, but three Unionists, including Powell, 
abstained in the vote of no-confidence which the government, supported by the Liberals with 
whom they did reach a deal, won comfortably.70 Callaghan then kept his promise of a 
Speaker’s conference, while placating the Liberals with a renewed commitment to 
devolution, this time in the form of separate bills for Scotland and Wales. 
The concession of the Speaker’s conference in effect removed any doubt that 
Northern Ireland representation would be increased; it now remained a matter of how many. 
Notwithstanding its opposition to the proposal, and the sense of inevitability that now 
surrounded it, the SDLP was represented at the conference in the form of its leader, Gerry 
Fitt. Both Molyneaux and Powell served along with pro-integration Conservatives, such as 
Ian Gow and Philip Goodhart. The conference first met on 27 July 1977, held a total of eight 
meetings, took oral and written evidence, and finally resolved by 18 votes to four that there 
should be an increase in the number of parliamentary constituencies in Northern Ireland, and 
by 22 votes to one that the figure should be 17.71 Legislation was eventually pushed through 
to this effect in 1979. 
In his evidence to the conference, Foot asserted that consideration of the question of 
representation in Northern Ireland should not prejudice subsequent debate affecting the UK 
as a whole; nor did he think that the conference should take into account the question of 
Northern Ireland receiving devolved government in the future. In relation to the latter issue, 
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Foot, in response to probing by Fitt, said that discussions about devolution looked like being 
‘blocked altogether’ because of the unsatisfactory nature of Northern Ireland representation, a 
comment that would appear to have related either to his desire to re-state the government’s 
wish for devolution to return to Northern Ireland in an acceptable form, or his frustrations 
over devolution more broadly, as recently evinced in the Scotland and Wales Bill fiasco.72 
In its written submission to the conference, the SDLP claimed that there were ‘good 
and fundamental reasons’ that Northern Ireland’s representation should be viewed differently, 
and that any decision to change the situation represented ‘a major departure from established 
practice’ and, therefore, constituted ‘a major political decision about the future of Northern 
Ireland’.73 Nationalist anxiety about a possible change in direction by the British government 
was also a theme taken up in Dublin. The Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, felt obliged to raise the 
matter in a meeting with Callaghan and Mason at the end of September 1977, and he was 
glad to receive what he took to be reassurances:  
Before I came I was concerned that recent events gave some people at least the impression that 
there was a move towards integration ... by reason of the Northern Unionists voting with the 
British government in certain divisions in the House of Commons, by reason of the 
establishment of the Speaker’s Conference the purpose of which is to increase the 
representation of the Northern Ireland members at Westminster. There was a feeling, then, that 
all these things might seems to point towards integration rather than devolved government and I 
was very happy to get the assurance from Mr. Callaghan that it was and remained the policy of 
the British government to have devolved government with power-sharing and that there would 
be no devolved government without power-sharing. He was very emphatic in this respect.74 
 
Nevertheless, any hopes Lynch might have entertained about progress being made on power-
sharing were to be frustrated during what remained of the Callaghan government. Mason’s 
main focus was decidedly on economic and security matters, and on representing direct rule 
in a more positive light.75 While in March 1978, Mason is reported as being eager to proceed 
with the legislation for an increase in Northern Ireland representation,76 he informed 
Callaghan in September of the same year that the prospect of such legislation undermined his 
work for a ‘partnership administration’ in the way it alienated Nationalists and brought 
satisfaction to Unionists.77 This might be interpreted as Mason attempting to evade any 
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political blame for a lack of progress towards the inter-party dialogue that he clearly felt 
stood little chance of success at that juncture. His scepticism regarding the launching of 
political initiatives for their own sake, without a secure enough grounding, was evident 
enough, and his outlook had much in common with that of Molyneaux and Powell. That said, 
the suggestion by Molyneaux that both he and Powell believed Callaghan to have been 
‘mugged’ by the Foreign Office and NIO as a ‘punishment’ for granting the increase in 
Northern Ireland MPs, seems far-fetched.78 What Molyneaux interpreted as the prime 
minister being warned against any further measures that would alienate Nationalists, would 
seem, more plausibly, to have been Callaghan’s desire to maintain cross-community 
devolved government for Northern Ireland as the government’s policy objective, in spite of 
the difficulties that the representation matter had caused and regardless of the remote 
prospects of a settlement actually being reached in the conflict. It made sense for Callaghan 
to preserve at least the appearance of balance while, for tactical reasons, he kept the Unionists 
close. Callaghan, according to the accounts of adviser, Bernard Donoughue, was keen for 
Mason not to be perceived as in the pocket of the Unionists,79 equally, in his own memoirs, 
Callaghan admits that his government had ‘never seemed in sight of an agreement’ that 
would have satisfied both sides in Northern Ireland.80 
Part of the reason why any political breakthrough was highly unlikely concerned, of 
course, the parliamentary arithmetic at Westminster during the Callaghan government’s 
desperate struggle for survival. To this, the tacit working arrangement that the government 
reached with the Unionists, primarily through the diplomacy between Foot, Molyneaux and 
Powell, was crucial. Having secured the verdict of the Speaker’s conference, the Unionists 
then needed to play a patient game to ensure that the relevant legislation would pass. In the 
light of much Labour opposition,81 and pressure exerted by Unionists in Northern Ireland to 
bring down the government, this was a precarious enterprise. An indication of the care taken 
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by Molyneaux not to risk the fulfilment of the goal of the increase was well illustrated by his 
choice of Wales as the basis of comparison for a change to the number of Northern Ireland 
MPs: had he chosen Scotland as the benchmark he would have been obliged to argue for 20 
or 21 seats rather than the 17 that were ultimately secured. Indeed, several of the Unionist and 
loyalist bodies that had submitted evidence to the Speaker’s conference had strongly urged 
that the Scottish example be followed.82 However, Molyneaux reasoned that Scotland was 
over-represented, and that in the advent of devolution would be likely to have its 
representation reduced. He did not want Ulster thrown into ‘the same melting pot’ if it was to 
receive devolution.83 
Molyneaux secured Callaghan’s personal intervention over the final passage of the 
bill to provide the extra seats amidst last-ditch attempts to thwart it in January 1979. The bill 
was duly given its assent in March. The careful parliamentary game orchestrated by 
Molyneaux and Powell received its pay-off. The tactical abstentions and occasional support 
for the government had done much to prolong its life. David Owen, foreign secretary in the 
Callaghan government, later reflected that the ‘informal’ Labour-Unionist pact, while less 
remarked upon than the formal and shorter-lasting ‘Lib-Lab’ pact, constituted ‘a more stable 
relationship’ and was ‘at least as important in the survival of the Labour government’.84 
Nemesis, however, arrived for Callaghan in the vital no-confidence motion in March when 
Gerry Fitt and Frank Maguire (Independent Nationalist) withdrew support from the 
government and brought it down, paving the way for the general election of May 1979.85 
4. Conclusion 
The question of raising the number of Northern Ireland MPs at Westminster during the 1970s 
brought together a number of significant political themes. The case for an increase following 
the removal of the devolved institutions in March 1972 highlighted the way that reduced 
representation for the province had been viewed as a fair ‘trade-off’ for devolution between 
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the years 1921 and 1972, and thus an important precedent for any future devolution schemes. 
The issue also drew attention to the broader anomaly of Northern Ireland MPs’ voting 
behaviour in the house of commons during the half-century of devolution, and provided a 
crucial reference point for the debate occasioned by devolution proposals for Scotland and 
Wales around what was christened in the mid 1970s, the ‘West Lothian Question’. 
In its eagerness to undermine Scottish and Welsh Nationalism through commitments 
to devolution, the Labour government, on its return to office in February 1974, failed to do 
sufficient ‘joined up’ constitutional thinking. The Wilson government took little heed of the 
Kilbrandon report’s recommendations in relation to pruning Scottish and Welsh 
representation in the event of devolution, and to increasing Northern Ireland’s quota of MPs 
in the absence of devolution. The provisions in the ‘Democracy and Devolution’ and ‘Our 
Changing Democracy’ papers for Scotland and Wales to maintain the same level of 
representation, served to sharpen the political demands for a Northern Ireland increase, and 
invited a critical onslaught around Labour’s apparent prioritising of its own party interest 
ahead of constitutional equity and fair dealing.86  
The Callaghan Labour government also exposed itself to the charge of using the 
matter in a nakedly instrumentalist fashion, first seeking to keep the promise of an increase as 
a bargaining chip to soften Unionist opposition to co-operation with the SDLP, then making 
the considerable concession of a Speaker’s conference on the Northern Ireland representation 
issue alone in order to form a working relationship with Unionists at Westminster. The 
government tried to keep its Northern Ireland policy options open for as long as it could, but 
its hand was forced by the loss of the guillotine motion over the Scotland and Wales Bill in 
February 1977. This episode demonstrated that attempts to compartmentalise the Northern 
Ireland problem and devolution for other parts of the UK were always liable to be frustrated. 
Indeed, Merlyn Rees, as Northern Ireland secretary, had been confronted by a heightened 
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Unionist desire to be made part of the apparent constitutional restructuring of the UK 
promised by the Labour government, and this, arguably, fed into the UUUC’s reluctance to 
concede any political ground to the SDLP at the constitutional convention. In short, the 
Northern Ireland question became deeply entangled in the political and parliamentary 
wrangling over devolution, representation, and constitutional change in general. Yet, rather 
puzzlingly, the Northern Ireland dimension to the fierce debates about the UK as a ‘union’ or 
‘unitary’ state in the 1970s has been routinely neglected.87 
The eventual passage of the legislation increasing Northern Ireland representation to 
17 was a substantial accomplishment for Ulster Unionism at Westminster, in particular the 
careful campaign plotted by Molyneaux and Powell. Yet the way the latter prioritised the 
matter and allowed it to be seen as emblematic of an integrationist strategy served to widen 
rifts among Unionists back in Northern Ireland. Indeed, Powell’s prominence seemed to 
antagonise the strand of Unionism that evinced scepticism about the likelihood of Ulster’s 
interests being advanced at Westminster, and put little store by government guarantees and 
assurances. Equally, Powell and Molyneaux did not appreciate that their success in relation to 
the representation issue was not likely to be the precursor of further Unionist gains of an 
integrationist nature given the government’s need to preserve at least the appearance of even-
handedness and a commitment, however compromised in practice by their parliamentary 
difficulties, to a power-sharing solution. The government had always to be careful to manage 
relations with Dublin carefully if it was to achieve its objectives regarding security and the 
quelling of IRA violence. 
Nationalist patience in Ireland, north and south, was sorely tested by the Northern 
Ireland representation saga, and there was much frustration about the prospects of peace 
being jeopardised for the government’s short-term gain. Nevertheless, some Nationalist and 
Republican reaction betrayed an inability to appreciate the political context in which the 
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government found itself, or the way that the issue had become entangled with wider UK 
constitutional questions since at least the time of the publication of the Kilbrandon report. 
Seán MacBride, a veteran Irish Republican who had acquired an international reputation for 
human rights causes by the 1970s, was quoted as saying of the decision to increase 
representation that it was ‘a far more damaging assertion of Britain’s intention to continue to 
assert her sovereignty in the six counties than anything that has happened so far’. ‘It is a 
provocative indication’, MacBride went on, ‘that Britain will continue to exercise her 
domination over the northeastern part of Ireland.’88 
This was a measure of how far Irish Republicans and even some moderate 
Nationalists continued to frame the Irish question in terms of an assumed British ‘imperialist’ 
mindset that other evidence, whether political diaries and memoirs or government records of 
the day, overwhelmingly refutes. Clearly, the symbolic significance of the increase in 
Northern Ireland representation should not be underestimated in relation to the depth of 
division between Unionists and Nationalists at this juncture over the nature of the conflict and 
how to make progress towards peace. Equally, there is little that might be drawn from the 
political saga surrounding the issue to suggest that the Labour government desired the closer 
integration of Northern Ireland, and it was certainly regretful about the impact the 
controversy had on its relations with the SDLP. It was, rather, a complication among many 
others during an exceptionally precarious tenure of office, and a matter that could not be 
prevented from spilling out into other realms of policy. 
 
                                                            
1 G. Walker, A History of the Ulster Unionist Party: Protest, Pragmatism and Pessimism (Manchester, 2004), 
77. 
2 A. Jackson, ‘“Tame Tory Hacks”? The Ulster Party at Westminster, 1922–1972’, Historical Journal, liv 
(2011), 453–75. 
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
3 The ‘West Lothian’ tag derived from the constituency of Tam Dalyell, the Scottish Labour MP who made the 
voting anomaly a central part of his critique of devolution. For the McKay Commission see Report of the 
Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons, March 2013 (published at 
tmc.independent.gov.uk) ; and commentary in I. McLean, ‘Reports and Surveys’, Political Quarterly, lxxxiv 
(2013), 395–8. 
4 D. Sandbrook, White Heat (2006), 98. 
5 TNA, HO 221/50: Professor Thomas Wilson, memorandum: ‘Regional Government (with special reference to 
Northern Ireland)’ (Nov. 1969), in ‘Royal Commission on the Constitution – Written Evidence (6) Northern 
Ireland’, 74.   
6 See relevant documents regarding Wilson’s intervention, in TNA, PREM 13/1663; also, Walker, Ulster 
Unionist Party, 155–6. 
7 TNA, PREM 13/1663: note of meeting between Wilson and O’Neill, 19 May 1965; see also K. Theakston, 
‘Prime Ministers and the Constitution’, Parliamentary Affairs, lviii (2005), 17–37. 
8 Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., dccxviii, cols 96–7: 26 Oct. 1965, cited in P. Bowers, ‘The West Lothian 
Question’, House of Commons Library Standard Note (SN/PC/2586), 18 Jan. 2012.    
9 P. Bew et al., Northern Ireland: 1921–2001 (2001), 126–32. 
10 G. Walker, ‘Scotland, Northern Ireland and Devolution, 1945 – 79', Journal of British Studies, xlix (2010), 
117–42. 
11 TNA, HO 221/113: G.B. Adams, memorandum (Feb. 1970), in ‘Royal Commission on the Constitution – 
Written Evidence (6) Northern Ireland’, 16.  
12 Adams, memorandum, 19. 
13 Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., dccxviii, col. 73: 26 Oct. 1965.   
14 Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., dccxviii, col. 80: 26 Oct. 1965. 
15 Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., dccxviii, col. 81: 26 Oct. 1965.   
16 Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., dccxviii, col. 81: 26 Oct. 1965.   
17 Public Record Office of Northern Ireland [hereafter cited as PRONI], D1327/20/1/31: Ulster Unionist Council 
yearbook, 1967.   
18 See The Crossman Diaries, abridged version, ed. Anthony Howard (1979), 312–3. 
19 National Library of Scotland (NLS), Mackintosh Papers, Dep 323/95: Mackintosh to Crossman, 31 Jan. 1967. 
20 Jackson, ‘“Tame Tory Hacks”?’, 469. 
27 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
21 Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1968–73, Cmnd 5460 (HMSO, 1973) [hereafter cited as Kilbrandon].   
22 Walker, ‘Scotland’, 129–30. 
23 It should also be kept in mind that significant local government functions were taken away, from 1970, and 
given to unelected bodies. On local government reform, see P. Arthur, Government and Politics of Northern 
Ireland (Harlow, 1980), 96–8. 
 
24 See A. Purdy, Molyneaux: The Long View (Antrim, 1989), 95–6. 
 
25 Jackson, ‘“Tame Tory Hacks”?’, 457; Walker, Ulster Unionist Party, 106, 122–3, 155–6. 
 
26 See Walker, Ulster Unionist Party, 196; Jackson, ‘“Tame Tory Hacks”?’, 472. 
 
27 Jackson, ‘“Tame Tory Hacks”?’, 459. 
 
28 Walker, Ulster Unionist Party, 218. 
 
29 Walker, Ulster Unionist Party, ch. 6. 
 
30 Initially it was 13, but the university seat was abolished in 1948. 
 
31 TNA, CJ4/545: Burns memorandum, 3 Jan. 1973. 
 
32 Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, Cmnd. 5259 (HMSO, 1973). 
 
33 The Cecil King Diary 1970–1974 (1975), 276; see also TNA, CJ4/517: note of meeting between the secretary 
of state (William Whitelaw) and UUP deputation, 12 Dec. 1972, at which Whitelaw admitted that the 
Conservative Party favoured an increase. 
 
34 Purdy, Molyneaux, 96. 
 
35 Kilbrandon, para. 1338; see also TNA, CJ4/517: note of meeting between Frank Cooper (NIO) and UUP 
leader, Brian Faulkner, 25 Oct. 1973, at which Faulkner said that any suggestion in the report of an increase 
would be ‘a great prize’. 
 
36 Walker, ‘Scotland’, 130. The government had actually considered delaying the publication of Kilbrandon to 
ease potential difficulties in this regard, but eventually consented to publication in Oct. 1973. 
 
37 Kilbrandon, para. 214. 
 
38 TNA, CJ4/338: Trevelyan to Miss Overy (home office), 11 July 1973. 
 
39 Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., dccclxiii, col. 121: 6 Nov. 1973: written question by Stratton Mills. 
Heath’s response was that the Northern Ireland representation issue could not be considered separately from 
devolution to Scotland and Wales.  
40 Daily Telegraph, 16 Nov. 1973. 
 
41 For discussion, see M. Cunningham, ‘Conservative Dissidents and the Irish Question: The Pro-Integrationist 
Lobby 1973–94’, Irish Political Studies, x (1995), 26–42. 
 
42 Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., dccclxxviii, col. 264: 29 July 1974; for Fitt contribution, cols 297–301.  
 
43 Democracy and Devolution: Proposals for Scotland and Wales, Cmnd 5732 (HMSO, 1974), paras 32, 33.  
 
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
44 See TNA, CJ1/89: memorandum dated 14 Dec. 1949. This had been the argument used against devolution by 
such figures as Scottish secretary of state, Arthur Woodburn, in the late 1940s, and it underpinned the Scottish 
party’s stance on the matter from 1958 through to 1974. See also evidence given to the royal commission by 
John P. Mackintosh, reproduced in John P. Mackintosh on Scotland, ed. H. Drucker (1982), 61–81. 
 
45 See M. Kerr, The Destructors (Dublin, 2010), 268, and 322–3 for Rees’s opposition to the increase in MPs; 
see also B. Donoughue, Downing Street Diary (2 vols, 2006–8), i, 285, for Rees and his anxiety about Scottish 
devolution complicating his work on Northern Ireland. 
 
46 Manifesto reproduced in R. Rose, Northern Ireland: A Time of Choice (Washington, DC, 1976 ), 81; see also 
H. Patterson and E. Kaufmann, Unionism and Orangeism in Northern Ireland since 1945 (Manchester, 2007), 
166, for policy statement of Apr. 1974. 
 
47 Our Changing Democracy: Devolution to Scotland and Wales, Cmnd 6348. 
 
48 Walker, ‘Scotland’, 135–6. 
 
49 In Oct. 1975, the leader of the Vanguard Unionist Party, William Craig, long regarded as one of the most 
extreme opponents of compromise, signalled his willingness to enter a voluntary coalition with the SDLP, but 
he could not carry sufficient Unionist support. 
 
50 See, e.g., Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention, Report of Debates (Belfast, 1975), 234, 239, 268, 282. 
 
51 M. Rees, Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective (1985), 21, 91–2, 202–3; also Kerr, Destructors, 298. The 
foreign and commonwealth office (FCO) certainly gave consideration to the idea of negotiated independence: 
see TNA, FCO 87/440: memorandum dated 28 Aug. 1975. 
 
52 P. Cothorn, ‘Enoch Powell, Ulster Unionism, and the British Nation’, Journal of British Studies, li (2012), 
967–97. 
 
53 See D.G. Boyce, ‘Dicey, Kilbrandon and Devolution’, Political Quarterly, xlvi (1975), 280–92; J. Mitchell, 
Devolution in the UK (Manchester, 2009), 222–5. 
 
54 PRONI, Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) Papers, D1327/21/40: Molyneaux speech dated 2 Apr. 1976. 
 
55 For detailed treatments of late 1970s Unionist politics, see Patterson and Kaufmann, Unionism, ch. 5; and 
Walker, Ulster Unionist Party, ch. 6. 
 
56 PRONI, D1327/21/40: Brush speech dated 27 Apr. 1976.  Strictly speaking Brush was mistaken if the 
manifesto is taken to be the UUUC one for the convention elections, but his assessment of grassroots feeling 
may well have been accurate. 
 
57 TNA, CJ4/784: ‘Call on the PM’, 30 Oct. 1975.  
 
58 PRONI, D1327/21/40: Powell speech dated 22 Apr. 1976. 
 
59 PRONI, D1327/21/40: West speech dated 14 May 1976. 
 
60 See, e.g., V. Bogdanor, Devolution (Oxford, 1979), 161; Mitchell, Devolution, 202–3; A. Marr, The Battle for 
Scotland (1992), 157–8. 
 
61 See house of commons debate on Scotland and Wales Bill: Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., cmxxv, cols 
261–2, 358, 418 (Powell), cols 377–8 (Pym), col. 393 (Kilfedder): 1 Feb. 1977.   
62 TNA, CJ4/1852: memorandum by JDN James, 5 Oct. 1976. 
 
63 TNA, CJ4/1852: memorandum by JM Stewart, 28 Oct. 1976; see also Mason, in Hansard, Commons Debates, 
5th ser., cmxxi, col. 1143: 2 Dec. 1976.  When Whitelaw was secretary of state he had also considered using the 
issue as a ‘carrot’ to Unionists to moderate their stance: see Kerr, Destructors, 64; and TNA, CJ4/517 (see 
above, note 32). 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
64 For an account of Foot’s management of the devolution issue, see K.O. Morgan, Michael Foot (2008), 351–9. 
 
65 TNA, CJ4/1852: memorandum by Foot on ‘Scottish and Welsh Representation in the House of Commons’, 
nd; see also TNA, CAB 128/61: 20 Jan. 1977. 
 
66 TNA, CJ4/1853: memorandum by JB Bourn, 1 Feb. 1977. 
 
67 TNA, CJ4/1853: memorandum by D. Chesterton, 9 Feb. 1977; see also Hansard, Commons Debates, 5th ser., 
cmxxv, cols 393–5: 1 Feb. 1977; and Powell’s claim in this debate that Foot did not believe in the case he was 
making (col. 413) and his statement that the Northern Ireland representation issue was ‘upon the conscience of 
the House and it will not go away until it is dealt with’ (col. 418). 
 
68 TNA, CJ4/1853: memorandum, nd. 
 
69 TNA, CAB 128/61: 24 Feb. 1977. Concerns were expressed about the ‘English dimension’ and the risks of 
the referendum option. 
 
70 See accounts in Purdy, Molyneaux, 101–9; J. Callaghan, Time and Chance (1988), 453–5. See also Hansard, 
Commons Debates, 5th ser., cmxxviii, cols 1302–4: 23 March 1977, for Callaghan’s remarks on dealings with 
the Unionists. 
 
71 Conference on Electoral Law, Cmnd 7110 (1978).  
 
72 House of Commons Paper 70–ii, Mr. Speaker’s Conference on Electoral Law, Minutes of Evidence, 30 Nov. 
1977 (HMSO, 1977).  
 
73 House of Commons Paper 70–iii, Mr. Speaker’s Conference on Electoral Law, Papers submitted to 
Conference July–Dec. 1977 (HMSO, 1978). 
 
74 Boston College Burns Library [hereafter cited as BCBL], T.P. O’Neill Papers, box 24/3: note of meeting, 28 
Sept. 1977. See Callaghan’s account in Time and Chance, 499 – the British government’s main concern was 
security. 
 
75 PRONI, FIN 30/R/1/1: file on ‘Administrative Devolution’; see undated memorandum accompanied by a note 
dated 19 Jan. 1977. 
 
76 Donoughue, Downing Street Diary, i, 299. 
 
77 PRONI, CENT/1/7/24: memorandum dated 13 Sept. 1978. 
 
78 Purdy, Molyneaux, 104–5. 
 
79 Donoughue, Downing Street Diary, i, 299, 334–5. 
 
80 Callaghan, Time and Chance, 500. 
 
81 See, e.g., T. Benn, Conflicts of Interest: Diaries 1977–80 (1990), 439; Donoughue, Downing Street Diary, ii, 
314. 
 
82 See House of Commons Paper, 70–iii (note 73 above), submissions by Democratic Unionist Party, Vanguard, 
Loyal Orange Institution of Scotland, and Unionist Party of Northern Ireland.  
 
83 Purdy, Molyneaux, 105. 
 
84 D. Owen, Time to Declare: Second Innings (2009), 190. 
 
85 The government lost by a single vote margin; two Ulster Unionists supported the government. 
 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
86 See M. Taylor, ‘Labour and the Constitution’, in Labour’s First Century, ed. D. Tanner et al. (Cambridge, 
2000). 
 
87 For a good summary of the ‘union’ and unitary’ state concepts, see I. McLean and A. McMillan, State of the 
Union (Oxford, 2005), ch. 1. The same book also exemplifies the tendency to ‘hive off’ Northern Ireland from 
discussion of political developments around devolution in the 1970s (see chs. 7–9), although not in relation to 
devolution finance (ch. 10). 
 
88 Quoted in BCBL, box 21/19: Congressional Record of 6 Mar. 1979. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
